John Locke was a chief architect of the modem system of money tha t was based on metallism or a gold and silver standard . An examinatio n of the early modern European monetary system, proceeding fro m Locke's ideas, can deepen an historical understanding of the uneve n opposition between European economic development and indigenism. The first part of this paper addresses the implications for indigenis t land ownership of Locke's location of money in the state of nature . Part II is about the English monetary system of Locke's time and his idea s about money ; Part III is an analysis of several conceptual issues involving monetary systems that are relevant to indigenist rights .
The term `indigenism' is currently used to refer to the traditions, interests, and goals of the descendants of original, or "pre-contact," inhabitants of lands that Europeans and Americans invaded an d exploited.l In general, during the modem period, indigenist civilization has been oppressed by European civilization . Although liberator y critics have addressed the political and moral aspects of European colonial oppression, not much, at least by philosophers, has been written about the nature of money. Money was the nonviolent mechanis m of land dispossession, which was the main material form of Europea n oppression of indigenists .
1 There are several reasons why scholars and activists now find 'indigenist ' preferable to 'native . ' The term 'native' may be too broad insofar as anyone born in a nation could be called 'native .' If 'native' is used to specificall y designate pre-contact natives, it carries derogatory connotations imposed b y . invading groups . The term 'indigenist' seems to best connote the land-based ethos of many contemporary inhabitants of dependent sovereign states . (Se e note 39, below, and the discussion of land-based economic issues in Section II I of the text of this article .)
However, as C .B. MacPherson points out, Locke included money , as a store of value, in his description of conditions of original acquisition.4 Locke assumed that precious metals are universally valued (explicitly or tacitly) in conditions of original acquisition, and his provis o against waste contained a loophole that surplus products of land could be exchanged for precious metals . 5 This in itself makes it unlikely tha t Locke would have recognized ownership where owners did not deliberately create surplus to be exchanged for precious metals . In the Second Treatise, Locke notes that without money, as was the situation in America, there would be little improvement of land :
For I ask, What would a Man value Ten Thousand, or an Hundred Thousan d Acres of excellent Land, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with Cattle, i n the middle of the in-land Parts of America, where he had no hopes of Commerce with other Parts of the World, to draw Money to him by the Sale of the Product? It would not be worth the inclosing, and we should see him give u p again to the wild Common of Nature, whatever was more than would suppl y the Conveniences of Life to be had there for him and his Family.
(II,V448)
This passage suggests that enclosure and continued occupation ar e necessary conditions for land ownership . Money is also required a s an incentive to prevent abandonment of otherwise valuable surplu s 4 MacPherson generally interprets Locke as having projected seventeenth-century English market conditions onto the state of nature . As will soon be evident, I agree with him that Locke located money in the state of nature . But the question that interests me in this paper is what Locke means by money . I will show in Section II that Locke's ideas about money in seventeenth-century Englan d rest on the same principles of natural law that apply in his description of th e state of nature . The philosophical examination of these principles means tha t Locke did not so much project conditions of his time onto a presumably earlie r state of nature; rather he thought that the same principles governed both th e state of nature and seventeenth-century culture . See C . land. On any theory of property, abandonment would signal the voluntary termination of ownership . Therefore, according to Locke, i t would be impossible for indigenous people in America to own mor e land than they immediately used, because they did not use money. On those grounds, Locke's theory of original appropriation does justify European appropriation of indigenist land . Locke may not have known that although indigenists had money , they chose not to accumulate it, and he may not have known about the existence of cultural systems that do not place a high value on th e acquisition and accumulation of money . Perhaps, if he had known these things, he would have thought that indigenists did not have the kin d of money that was valuable in itself, or that they lacked a monetary system capable of affording them those conveniences and luxuries tha t he believed human beings ought to labour to acquire .
Textually, Locke equivocated between `money' in the sense of a precious object of exchange and 'money' as currency that is part of a national or international system of exchange . In the passages where he introduces money into the state of nature, he first talks about a person engaged in the simple exchange of goods that would otherwise spoil for precious objects :
If he would give his Nuts for a piece of Metal, pleased with its colour; or exchange his Sheep for Shells, or Wool for a sparkling Pebble or a Diamond, an d keep those by him all his Life, he invaded not the Right of others, he might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased ; theexceeding of the bounds of his just Property not lying in the largess of his Possession, but the perishing of any thing uselesly in it . (II, V, 46 ) But after Locke goes on to imagine the abundant parcel of land tha t would be abandoned, for lack of the power "to draw money" to it s owner in the "inland parts of America" (in II, V, 48, quoted above), h e refers to money as currency in a wider system . Money in the second systematic sense is a way to own more land than one needs for it s products and for some to own more land than others ; and Locke maintains that these unequal effects of the use of money occur in conditions before government :6 Locke's location of money in the state of nature may be fair insofa r as it was associated with acquisition due to labour . And it may be just , because God did not object to it . But, after original acquisition base d on labour, subsequent acquisition could accompany sloth, and tha t would be unfair . And without God's authority, the location of mone y in a state of nature would be unjust, in the sense of inequitable, due t o cultural differences . A monetary system gives to some members of communities that have it, advantages (in the form of more man-mad e goods, techniques and services) over members of communities tha t do not . This is particularly true when the communities with monetar y systems have currencies translatable among each other and more military power than communities without monetary systems .
These oppressive effects of money were not considered by Lock e because his paradigm owner was a European middle-class farmer . If his description of the state of nature is meant to be historical, his paradigm is simply an anachronistic projection from his own historical context. But suppose that his description of the state of nature is normative, because it provides a contract-theory template for justifying politica l society. In that case, Locke might have claimed that the majority o f humankind would find the situation of a European middle-class farme r an ideal human situation, which would make his error(s) more complicated to pinpoint : Locke erred in universalizing that particular historical ideal and/or he erred in failing to consider that the inability o f some to attain that ideal makes it unsuitable as a test for a just society , especially if the attainment of the ideal for some would require it s unattainablity for others .
In connecting money to ownership, insofar as money was an incentive to improve, and thereby own, land, Locke overlooked important general cultural and historical alternatives to individual ownershi p based on continuously-worked enclosed parcels : land has been owne d and worked by communities, with surplus products traded amon g neighbours; land has been owned with occasional use by owners wh o occupy it continually or intermittently ; land has been owned for th e purposes of hunting, fishing and recreation (including aesthetic appreciation). These are all types of situations in which land has been left i n what Locke would consider a form of common, but ownership ha s nonetheless been recognized. (For example, in Locke's own day, European governments recognized indigenist ownership of land when they entered into treaties with indigenists ; commons were owned by European peasants; and nobles owned vast tracts of land that had neve r been improved .) In addition, land and water (such as the oceans) hav e by consent been left in what Locke would consider their original common, without private ownership, throughout historical conditions tha t have followed the widespread use of money -either because suc h land would be too difficult to possess, or because it is owned by governments. (Locke was aware of this when he spoke of the ocean as "tha t great and still remaining Common of Mankind." See II,V,30 .) Also, it is at least conceivable that parts of the earth might be left in commo n because they have intrinsic worth and ought for their own sake not b e laboured upon, or otherwise interfered with, by human beings .? Locke' s historical assumption that money eliminates the common is therefor e wrong. The historical facts generally seem to support a pluralisti c model of the existence of commons and the existence of private property, both during and after the state of nature (or before and after th e existence of civil government) . Perhaps more to the point, agains t Locke, both commons and private property seem to have existed bot h before and after the existence of money and monetary systems .
These broad historical facts of the existence and nonexistence o f money and government, intersecting with instances of private property and commons, make Locke's introduction of money and monetary systems into the state of nature appear normative . Locke can be reinterpreted, not as making factual claims about the effects of money, but as claiming that money and its use have social value . Locke referred to the nonuse of money and resulting lack of incentive to privately and individually own more land than needed for survival as a form of social isolation : It is not clear in this passage whether Locke means that those wh o do not use money are thereby, in some general and total sense, isolated from the productive majority of humankind, or whether they hav e merely not consented to the use of money but otherwise remain par t of the constructive human community. There is a second, perhaps related, confusion concerning the value of money according to Locke . Is money and its pursuit valuable in principle or intrinsically, so tha t money justifies labour? Or is labour itself a primary value -because God intended humans to labour -and money therefore a secondar y value because it is an incentive to labour? We know that Locke though t God gave humanity the earth and that human "wants" forced them to labour and appropriate (II,V,35); furthermore, God gave the earth to the use of "the rational and industrious (II,V, 34) . If labour were a primary value, then ownership ought to accrue to those who labour, simply because they labour and not because they "draw money" t o themselves. Although there is no direct textual answer to this question whether labour or money is the primary good, Locke would see m to be committed to the primary value of labour because he explicitly claims that God made it necessary for people to labour, and he doe s not explicitly claim that God commanded them to use and accumulate money. (Although there were writers in Locke's day who viewe d money itself as a God-given human asset.)8 At any rate, I think it can safely be concluded that Locke posited money as a primary social institution, and a very good one . This raises the question of what Locke had in mind by money as a social institution .
II. The Nature of Money According to Lock e
Today, we accept that money is a means for exchanging goods an d services, as well as a measure of wealth, which is backed by politica l authority and supported by social convention . We live in immense an d complex networks of paper currency, electronic money, and credit that have no intrinsic value . That is, our money is not otherwise materiall y precious. There has been no pretense that money symbolizes anythin g materially precious since the early 1970s when the major countries of the West abandoned the gold standard . Without the gold standard, the major Western currencies are intrinsically worthless and they "float " against one another with no fixed rates of exchange . These currencies are all `fiat money.'9
For about two hundred years before the gold standard was abandoned, the major Western currencies were "backed up" by fixed quantities of gold and sometimes silver held by governments and centra l banks. This entailed that each unit of a currency had a fixed rate o f exchange with wilts of other currencies because it represented a fixe d amount of the same precious metal . Gold and silver themselves were also in a fixed quantitative ratio during any period of time . And, at least in principle, units of paper or base metal currency could be exchanged on demand for the precious metal they represented .
Furthermore, prior to this system of 'hard currency,' all currency had intrinsic value. Thus, by 'money,' Locke did not mean paper o r even coin that represented precious metals . He was referring to actual pieces of silver and gold, principally silver, because England was stil l on a silver standard during the second half of the seventeenth century. This intrinsically valuable nature of European money in Locke' s day solemnifies the exclusionary anti-indigenist implications of hi s Second Treatise principles of land ownership .
Money, for Locke, could not have been 'only money,' and its pursuit and accumulation was a highly respectable activity, if not a mora l calling in its own right . His specific writings on interest rates and devaluation indicate that he believed there were important moral principles involved in protecting the existing intrinsic value of currency . One would expect those views to be consistent with natural law, if not actually derived from it, because Locke generally assumed that a jus t government preserved human society and did not contradict the principles of natural law t o Locke developed his views on monetary policy as a political advisor in a complicated economic and monetary context .11 Space does not permit a detailed description of that context here, but the followin g conditions are directly relevant . During the late seventeenth century in England, there was a bimetal monetary system . Both silver and gold currency had fixed rates of exchange to each other and to silver and gold bullion. Real money was the existing coin in circulation, actua l (silver) shillings and (gold) guineas, for example . Imaginary money consisted of the official units of currency that were used to keep accounts, for example, the terms 'shillings' and 'guineas' and the notations for them . Monetary crises resulted when the real money (actua l currency) had less silver content than the imaginary or official money . Such discrepancy was mainly caused by the clipping off of parts o f silver coins in circulation . When clipped coins were presented to the government in payment of revenue, or to the Mint for silver bullion, the government lost silver bullion in the exchange . The country also lost silver due to the export of coin and bullion as payment of expenses incurred in foreign wars .
The clipped coins in circulation drove unclipped coins into hoards . In foreign markets, the shilling was worth less than its official amount of silver in the English imaginary system . In England, gold sold for 10 A general example of Locke's reliance on natural law in this way is his clai m that men have life, liberty, and property according to natural law and that thei r consent is therefore required for the existence of civil government (see i n particular : Two Treatises, II, VIII, 119-22 and II,XI, 134 and 138) . gain in silver could be doubled when clipped shillings were presente d to the government for their full face amount .) As silver currency los t value, the market exchange rate between gold and silver coins favoure d gold coins, creating a discrepancy between the real gold-silver coi n ratio and the official one . Both the debasement of silver coins and thei r scarcity had a stagnating effect on domestic trade and caused price s of goods to rise. The scarcity of currency made business investmen t difficult and created pessimism about profits . Immediate monetary crises were perceived to be located in the shortage of real money because the economy was based on real money (cash) . Several solutions to these problems were proposed and debated : pass laws lowering interest rates to facilitate investment ; devalue the currency or "raise the coin" so that the imaginary money corresponde d in silver content with the real money ; control the price of guineas to discourage speculation ; punish clippers and counterfeiters more severely; recoin the currency as milled coins that could not be clipped ; revalue the clipped currency in circulation, based on its actual silve r content, so that, for example, a clipped shilling would be worth less than an intact shilling . 12
Locke was against lowering the interest rate ,13 against devaluation, 14 in favour of revaluation of clipped coins at their actual weight in silver , 15 We see here a crucial difference between Locke's Second Treatise introduction of money into the state of nature, as a "piece of metal" wit h an agreeable color or a "sparkling pebble" to be kept over a lifetim e (II,V,46), and his economic definition of money as a notational symbol that facilites business and trade . Nonetheless, Locke's notational definition of money does not mean he thought that accounts could be kep t in an arbitrary way, or that even the government could effectively influence the terms of financial transactions. Rather, the abstract nature of money seems to have facilitated precision about what could an d could not be done with it . (We can also be assured that in the seventeenth century, as today, "quantity" meant "an amount" that in a mathematical sense could be operated upon "according to fixed mutuall y consistent laws." Locke's use of "intrinsick" was also the same a s ours.)21 Locke defended what we would call hard currency and deflationary monetary policies as though they expressed inviolable scientific laws that were at the same time moral laws, that is, as thoug h they were instances of natural law.
Locke argues empirically against lowering the interest rate but hi s arguments are based on his first principles of political philosophy fro m the Second Treatise . He reasons that borrowed money is like any othe r commodity in that its price is determined by money in circulation an d the need for it . Therefore, if rates are artificially lowered, they will i n fact continue to be determined by the scarcity of money and the amoun t of money available to pay for borrowing it . Those who break the law will find a way to increase rates beyond a natural market increase due to demand so as to make up for the risk they take in breaking the law . The market forces and actual transactions will continue to go on according to their own exigencies . As a result, people will be forced t o perjure themselves on a widescale basis and the attendant guilt and temptation will result in widespread confusion that will make it "impossible for the Society (these Bonds [of truth and trust] being dissolved) to subsist ."22 In this regard, Locke thinks it is the duty of lawmakers not to make penalties for perjury more severe, but to minimize the temptations to it .23 This argument, which places custom an d the well-being of society above the authority and rightness of positiv e law, is evocative of his Second Treatise theme that society is prior to , and its well-being more important than, government . "The first and fundamental natural Law, which is to govern even the Legislature itself, is the preservation of the Society, and (as far as will consist with the public k good) of every person in it" (II, XI, 134) .
Locke also addresses the possibility that a law lowering interest rate s will be obeyed . He argues that an artificially lowered rate would b e bad for the nation because it would discourage foreign investment . This in turn would lessen the balance of trade for England . According to Locke, a favourable balance of trade meant very simply that mor e silver and gold (i .e ., more money) would be imported than exported . This favourable balance could not be reckoned simply in more good s exported than imported, because the goods would ultimately be valued in money . And neither could a favourable balance be reckoned i n credit because credit was nothing more than an agreement for debtor s to pay money (i.e., bullion) . 24 The simplicity of Locke's mercantilist model proceeds directly fro m an extended example he gives of the financial health of a family far-m :25 A thrifty father builds up a fortune by consistently spending less mone y on commodities at the market than what he gets for his "Cattle, Corn , Butter, Cheese, Wooll or Cloth, Lead and Tin ." His son and heir, wh o has extravagant tastes, does the reverse, to his eventual ruin . And, Locke concludes, "A Farm and a Kingdom in this respect differ no mor e than as greater and less ." 26 Locke's position against devaluation or raising the coin rests on th e presumption that the coin, or silver money, has intrinsic value due to its silver content . But keeping in mind his definition of "intrinsick value" as quantity, it turns out that his intention is to preserve a sameness of quantity in a sense that is analytic .
During the 1690s, clippers had depleted the silver content of rea l money (i.e., money in circulation) by about a third, and speculator s profited by exchanging light coin for full-weight coin at the Mint . Besides the loss to the government, the result was a shortage of mone y in circulation, a lack of confidence in the currency, and higher prices , especially in gold coin and bullion .27 William Lowndes, Secretary of the Treasury, proposed that the silver content of coin in circulation b e lowered by law to accommodate the de facto devaluation, bringin g full-weight coins out of hoards and alleviating the crisis . Locke was instrumental in defeating Lowndes's proposal through his argument s in Further Considerations . Their actual dispute is not very interestin g insofar as it turned on a semantic difference : Lowndes defined mone y as real money in circulation and Locke defined money as official money . Therefore, Lowndes thought that gold and commodities derived thei r value from the silver content of the money in circulation that was pai d for them, that is, their price in (actual) clipped coins, whereas Lock e insisted that value was determined by prices commanded in fullweight coin, that is, specified (imaginary) coin .28 Thus, Lownde s thought that the value of silver was determined by amounts of money and Locke thought that the value of money was determined b y amounts of silver. The basis on which Locke defended a revaluation of clipped coinage, according to its actual weight in silver, further clarifies his definitions of money in Some Considerations. First, Locke insisted that silve r was the universal money, based on "common consent" to its use in trade . Furthermore, "[shiver is the measure of commerce by its quantity, which is the measure also of its intrinsick value ."29 Coinage of silver by government does nothing more than guarantee its quality and quantity. Because silver is the common measure of all other commodities, and the only such measure, clipping is a crime (both robbery and treason) and the terms of exchange cannot be influenced b y decreeing that a coin of a certain denomination will be worth a different amount of silver than it was previously decreed to be worth . If th e coin is raised or devalued in its silver content, domestic creditors an d renters will unjustly be paid less silver than they contracted for, an d foreign traders will simply translate the revalued currency into its silver content and adjust their prices according . The only way that money in a nation that has no silver mines can be increased is if the value i n silver of exports is greater than the value in silver of imports . "
If we keep in mind Locke's continual repetition that the intrinsi c value of silver is its quantity, his claims amount to this : Based on consent to use silver as money and government oversight of the quantit y and quality of silver in denominations of coin, the ratio of any denomination of coin to silver bullion ought to be a constant . This constan t was an absolute for Locke :
The Standard once settled by public Authority, the quantity of Silver establish' d under the several denominations, (I humbly conceive) should not be altered , till there were an absolute necessity shewn of such a change, which I think can never be.31 Locke did not think that silver had any value in itself, as a specia l substance, although its durable properties of purity, consistency , portability, malleability, and so forth made it convenient as a measur e of all other goods . It is also clear from his argument that he assume d the sphere of trade to be factually and morally independent of government:
Raising of Coin is but a specious word to deceive the unwary. It only gives th e usual denomination of a greater quantity of Silver to a less, (v g . calling four Grains of Silver a Penny to day, when Five Grains of Silver made a Penny yesterday) but adds no worth or real value to the Silver Coin, to make amends fo r its want of Silver. That is impossible to be done . For it is only the quantity of the Silver in it that is, and eternally will be, the measure of its value . 32
III. Money and Indigenist Critical Issues
If we put together the importance Locke placed in The Second Treatis e on gold and silver money for ownership in the state of nature with hi s insistence on a constant silver standard for silver money in the English economy, the result is a closed system . Money is necessary to own land that will produce surplus goods that will be exchanged for mone y that can be used to buy man-made goods that will provide incentiv e to create more such goods . The medium for all such trade is money i n circulation . Some of the money in circulation will go into investmen t in land, to be rented out for income in money . Indeed, as C .B . MacPherson notes, Locke equates land and money because both ca n be lent to produce income, or money, from "tenants. "33 The aim of al l trade, be it between a farm and the outside world or a nation and other nations, is to end up with a positive balance of money . Along the way, conveniences, luxuries, and varied social activities would doubtles s be enjoyed, but all of these goods are desirable due to their location i n the system of money-trade-money .
Money, which for Locke was silver, is intrinsically valuable . But intrinsic value for Locke means nothing more than quantity or the ability to be used as a constant measure of exchange . This is particularly the case when the ratio between coin denomination and silver content is invariable over time, as Locke insisted it should be . It would seem , therefore, that the end of all serious human endeavour can be reduce d to a positive balance in an ongoing notational system . The mechanism of trade, facilitated by money and motivated by a desire for profitultimately to be measured in money -is the dynamic force in th e system: "Trade then is necessary to the producing of Riches and Mone y necessary to the carrying on of Trade ." 34
Of course, Locke's economic writings are not the last word on Western monetary systems and neither do they tell the whole story. There are libraries of economic theory between Locke and Keynes ; and, between the fiat monetary climate we live in today and Locke's time , there is a history of over two hundred years of the gold standard .35 Nonetheless, Locke's ultimate focus on money as nothing more tha n an accounting system has an eerie resonance with the economic etho s of contemporary multi-national corporations . What counts in corporate contexts is not community well-being, employment among th e 34 Locke, Some Considerations, in Locke on Money, vol . 1, 223-24 .
35 Twentieth-century fiat money is not backed up by precious objects but merel y proclaimed to be money by government decree . However, there is an uncanny inversion between Locke's explanation of the intrinsic value of gold and silver and what fiat money apologists have said about intrinsic value . Locke claime d that gold and silver money has intrinsic value because it is pure quantity, wherea s the chartalists have claimed that no money has intrinsic value because all money is pure quantity. Thus, the real issues in both cases have been whether certain equations ought to be changed or not . In Locke's day it was an issue of whethe r the equations between units of precious metals and money ought to be changed ; in our century it has been a question of whether the equations between units o f money and units of goods -which is to say, prices ---ought to be changed b y changing the money supply. citizens of one country or another, quality of goods, quality of environment, quality of human life, but the bottom line : Is the company making a profit in terms of its purely quantitative notational syste m (which by widespread consent is now reckoned in dollars) ?
There have been models for human systems, both before and afte r the existence of civil government, that do not use accounting to recko n ultimate value as in the Lockean imaginary . And even within that imaginary, people have private and public values apart from th e monetary "bottom line ." Nonetheless, historically, money as an international medium of exchange provided the motive and mechanis m for the appropriation of indigenist property in the Americas, as wel l as that of 'commoners' in Europe ; it was also the principal motive and mechanism of colonial rule and chattel slavery . (Money in this sens e has also worked as a medium of dispossession for twentieth-centur y farmers, in "in-land America" as well as the third world . Thus , Locke's belief that the property rights of individuals are secure d through monetary systems has turned out to be naive .) 36
Many writers have stressed the fact that non-whites and non-Europeans have been most severely victimized by the European an d later, American, economic system .;? However, if the modern concept of race had never been invented there is no reason to believe that the modem Western monetary system would have worked any differ -36 Loss of land because the surplus produced on it is not enough to finance othe r necessities of life or to finance the market value of the land (which is borrowe d when the land is mortgaged) could be a case in which farmers do not own thei r land to begin with, or have miscalculated in putting that ownership at risk.
What would Locke have said about farmers in present "third-world" countrie s who lose land, livelihood, and even life because their governments first allo w imports of foodstuffs at cheaper prices than can be offered domestically and can neither compensate the farmers after the imports rise in price nor bu y enough imported foodstuffs to feed their populations? For a quick overvie w on present free trade agreements and their effects on small agricultura l producers, see Kristin Dawkins, Lockean Money, Indigenism and GlobaIism ently.38 For cogent criticism of this system, the first tradition that suggests itself is Marxism . However, Marxist criticism does not do full justice to the clash between Western monetary society, which includes Euro-American trading partners in Asia and Africa, and indigenist cultures . Marxis t economic analyses of oppression are, despite the international dimension of labour, not sufficiently international or more precisely, intersystemic. Most of the disadvantaged and oppressed in industrial an d post-industrial nations -groups that include the working poor, members of the "underclass," the homeless, and non-white minorities who have suffered economic discrimination due to racial designation --have material problems that could be substantially solved if they ha d more money. To some extent, the same can be said of women, homosexuals, the aged, and other groups who experience oppression base d on what the dominant (white male group) perceives to be some kin d of biological difference from itself . These groups are all therefore par t of the Euro-American money-trade-money system .
But there are disadvantaged and oppressed groups whose materia l problems would not be solved with more money. Unlike labourers , homeless, non-whites, women, homosexuals, and the aged who ar e part of the Western monetary system but do not have enough money (or opportunity to get more), many indigenists have not fully belonge d to the Western monetary system, and a good part of their ongoin g struggle for recognition of their sovereign rights involves resistance t o that system . Ward Churchill, Russell Means, and Vine Deloria, Jr ., have all argued forcefully against the applicability of Marxist analysis to the property rights of land-based peoples and to their cultural situations . Churchill points out that the Marxian "New Left" has failed to addxess indigenous rights in its twentieth-century political polemics an d 'praxes .' One telling issue is a silence on the part of anarchists abou t 38 Colonialism and the slave trade were well underway before the biologica l concept of race had been developed . See Naomi Zack, Bachelors policy toward treaty law in the advent of the demise of Western capitalist government . Another immediate American indigenist concer n voiced by Churchill and others is the general Marxist presumption tha t technology will ultimately solve all material and environmental problems. This presumption ignores indigenist demands for environmental integrity that call for less rather than more extraction of natura l resources from American Indian lands .39 Russell Means argues that Marxism itself is a development within the Western abstract projec t that can only solve problems within EuroAmerican society . 40 Vine Deloria questions the applicability to indigenous society of the Marxist concept of the alienation of human beings from the world . 41 Deloria's analysis is underscored by Frank Black Elk's description of the absenc e of divisions corresponding to Euro-American social class in the Lakot a tradition .42 Black Elk's contrast comes down to the importance o f money in the Euro-American tradition :
It's all a matter of the "will" and ability to accumulate material ; the standard also indicates a need to constantly arrange and rearrange material . The standard of measure seems to me to be that the more compulsive a culture can become in terms of gathering up and rearranging material, the more "advanced " it is considered to be . The more relaxed, at peace, and willing to leave materia l things (beyond real needs) alone a culture can be shown to be, the more "backward" it is considered . 43 The challenge presented by the inadequacy of the Marxist critiqu e in addressing indigenist claims of injustice is to find conceptual way s of explaining the gap between indigenist and Euro-American material values . Given the importance of money in the Euro-American system, an adequate global model of political entities that exist in th e world, which postulates equal rights for those entities, would have t o specifically account for differences in monetary systems . The inclusion of indigenist political systems in such a model would require adjustments that would protect the economic vulnerabilities of indigenist t o non-indigenist systems . If monetary systems are not mentioned in models for global justice, then money will continue to seep out of the EuroAmerican system as the main instrument of its expansion at the expense of indigenist land-based systems . (And if indigenist political system s are excluded from the global model, the model is not just .) Max Weber's distinction between formal and substantive rationality may be of some use here . Formal rationality pertains to the calculations made within a monetary system by the producers of goods , given demand . Substantive rationality pertains to the relationship between the distribution of goods to members of a system and nonmonetary cultural values that include equal distribution of th e necessities of life and equal opportunities to acquire goods ." If w e move to a more abstract level that encompasses different economi c systems, we could say, first, that full participation in the Western monetary system is not substantively rational to members of many indigenous nations because it conflicts too strongly with their other cultura l values . Second, the substantive rationality of the entire global system , encompassing both indigenist and Western nations, requires that th e Western monetary system not be imposed on indigenous nations . That is, the diverse substantive monetary rationality of nations would hav e to be accepted and protected on a model of just global monetary pluralism.
Speaking very generally, the main difference in substantive rationality between indigenous and Western nations would seem to be th e cultural value placed on trade with individuals and entities outside the nation in question . Western nations assume that external trade i s an important part of their economic system . If indigenous nations d o not place the same value on such trade, they therefore, on thos e grounds alone, have less need for that "universal" medium of exchang e which is money. In many cases, the money of Westerners function s destructively within indigenous land bases, especially when Wester n money cart be used to acquire parts of those land bases and especiall y when alienation of communally owned property has and would continue to violate core non-monetary cultural values . It might therefor e be helpful to the political cause of indigenous liberation if leaders gav e more consideration, first to the exclusion of Western money from thei r own cultural transactions, and second to demands that this exclusion , and its consequences, be recognized by non-indigenist governments . 45 We should now go back to that ambiguous passage of Locke's regarding money and humanity :
Yet there are still great Tracts of Ground to be found, which (the Inhabitants thereo f not having joyned with the rest of Mankind, in the consent of the Use of thei r common Money) lie waste, and are more than the People, who dwell on it, do , or can make use of, and so still lie in common . Tho' this can scarce happen amongst that part of Mankind, that have consented to the Use of Money . (II,V,45)
The ambiguity of whether he meant that those who had not consented to the use of money were thereby not part of the human order, or merely not part of the monetary order, can be settled on a normative global model . Those who have not consented to the use of the ' Lockean Money, Indigenism and Globalism Western monetary system are part of the human order and their nations part of the national order, although neither they nor their nations are part of the monetary order. Insofar as the monetary order i s based on consent, the monetary order should not be imposed on thos e who have not consented to it. Returning to the introductory remark s in this paper and to the theme of the volume, the monetary order is a facet of Western civilization that operates as a mechanism of oppression whenever it is imposed on other civilizations without their consent. Of course, it may also be oppressive within its civilization(s) o f origin, but that is another matter.
